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What is the soul? 
 “…Is [it] always 
unchanging and 
constant, or is it different 
at different times? 
 Can [it], ever admit any 
sort of change?
 Or [is the soul] uniform 
and independent, 
remain unchanging and 
constant, never 
admitting any sort of 
alteration whatever?” 
 But what about the many 
[souls]?
 What about the many [souls]? 
What about all the things that 
are called by the same name as 
those real beings?
 Are they constant, or in contrast 
to those is it too much to say 
that they are never identical with 
themselves nor identically 
related to one another? 
Phaedo 78d-e, Tr. Hackforth
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Α6
 “…he states that besides sensible things 
and Forms there exists an intermediate 
class, the objects of mathematics, which 
differ from sensible things in being 
eternal and immutable, and from the 
Forms in tha thtere are many similar 
objects of mathematics, where each 
Form is itself unique.” 987b15-18 Trans. 
H. Tredennick
Euclid’s Elements VII
 Def. 2 
 Ἀριθμὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον 
πλῆθος.
 ‘number’ is composed of a plurality of units
○ [Number is a limited multitude]
Euclid’s Elements VII
 Def. 1 
 Μονάς ἐστιν, καθ᾽ἣν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν 
λέγεται.
 A unit is that which each of the things is 
called one.
Euclid’s Elements VII
 Def. 6 
 Ἄρτιος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ δίχα διαιρούμενος.
 An even number is [that which can] be 
divided into two.
Euclid’s Elements VII
 Def. 7
 Περισσὸς δὲ ὁ μὴ διαιρούμενος δίχα ἢ ὁ 
μονάδι διαφέρων ἀρτίου ἀριθμοῦ.
 An odd number is that which cannot be 
divided into two OR [that which] differs from 
an even number by a unit. 
Analogy
 Just as there is nothing intrinsic that 
makes a body alive, there is nothing 
intrinsic to a number—only an even 
one—that makes it have an equal 
collection of units. 
Analogy
 Yet there is a nec. connection with a 
soul’s participation in the Form Life, 
which makes the soul “alive” just as
 There is a nec. connection with a unit’s 
participation in the Form Odd, which 
makes the unit ‘odd’. 
Skipped section: 
 Plato avails himself two ontological 
distinctions of arithmos:
 Collections of sensible particulars 
○ Uses the neutered plural
 Collections of units
○ Uses the feminine singular
Final Proof
1. When objects lose or gain characteristics, 
they undergo change (103b2-31)
2. When objects lose their essential 
characteristics, they cease to exist (103e2-
103e5)
3. There are some objects that never lose their 
essential characteristics (103e6-104b1)
Final Proof
4. ἡ τριάς and ἡ ψυχή never lose their essential 
characteristics, ‘odd’ and ‘life’ (104a3-8, 
105d2-3)
5. What never loses its essential characteristic 
will always exclude that essential 
characteristic’s opposite from coming into 
being in that object. (104c7-d3)
6. The opposite of odd is even, opposite of life is 
death (104d12-14, 105d6-9)
Final Proof
7. Whatever never loses its essential 
characteristic is everlasting (106a1)
8. Whatever loses its essential characteristic is 
not everlasting (106b3-c8)  
9. Soul never loses its essential characteristic 
life (105d3-34)
10. Whenever a living body loses its soul, it dies 
(106e3)
Final Proof
11. Whatever has as its essential characteristic, 
life, is immortal (premises 1-6)
12. Whatever is immortal is everlasting (premises 
7-11)
Therefore: A living body is neither immortal nor 
everlasting (106c5). Soul, itself by itself, is 
immortal and everlasting (106e9-107a
An ontological distinction
 Τὰ τρία [Socrates]
 ἡ τριάς [Soul of Socrates]
